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NOTES AND COMMENTS

logically follows that a suit by a minor, whether emancipated or unemancipated, will not disrupt the peace and harmony of the family unit
where the parent is covered by liability insurance. Under the Tucker
case a minor may protect his property rights by suing the parent, but
has no civil redress for any torts committed by the parent, no matter how
willful or malicious they may be.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has forged ahead in writing
progressive law in suits between husband and wife, but has declined to
do so in suits between minor and parent. The Oklahoma scales of
justice do not seem to balance where the peace and harmony of the
family unit are concerned.
James D. Williams

PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THE PRIVITY PRINCIPLE IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND ITS EROSION IN OKLAHOMA
All liability stems from a breach of duty on the part of one person
resulting in damage to another in person, property or the rights in
either. In Tort, that breach issues from a wrongful act or omission and
thus, is based on a concept of fault. In Contract, it arises from a failure
or neglect to adhere to the rights, duties and responsibilities expressly
or impliedly agreed upon by the parties. In either event, the important
relationship between the parties giving rise to liability is that condition,
circumstance or relationship called duty. If a contract does not impose a
duty or if the relationship of the parties in tort does not impose a duty,
there can be no liability regardless of the acts or omissions of the related
persons.
The question then arises, "What does duty have to do with privity?"
Privity has been defined as a derivative interest founded on, or growing
out of, contract, connection, or bond of union between parties; mutuality
of interest.' However, privity has assumed a slightly different role as
related to products liability cases. Duty and privity, although not
technically synonymus, have become interdependent to such an extent
that it may be said, as a general rule, privity creates duty. Therefore, in
the absence of privity there is no duty, thus no liability.
The progenitor of the privity principle was Winterbottom v.
Wright.2 In that old English decision, the court refused recovery to an
injured coachman on the ground that he was not privy to the contract
between the postmaster general of England and the defendant contractor
who supplied a certain defective coach, concluding there was no duty
between the coachman and the supplier of the coach in absence of
privity. More important than the actual holding was the dicta of Lord
Abinger, C.B., who said that there was "no privity of contract between
IHodgson v. Midwest Oil Co., 17 F.2d 71, 75.
210 Mees & W. 109 (1842), 152 Eng. Reprint 402; For discussion and
criticism see 74 A.L.R.2d 1131 § 5 (b).
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these parties," and that if the plaintiff could sue, "every passenger, or
even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting
of the coach," might bring a similar action and "the most absurd and
outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit," would ensue.
Clearly, it was not necessary to decide the rights of such peripheral
persons as passengers and persons upon the highway. So the general rule
of non-liability of a manufacturer, contractor, or supplier in the absence
of privity was born in dicta and broadly applied with its impact being
felt in Oklahoma to some extent almost a century and a quarter after
Lord Abinger's statement. The object then, of this study, is to determine
the force of the application of the general rule in Oklahoma at this time.
Shortly after inception, a major exception to the rule was laid down
in the United States in Thomas v. Winchester The court was concerned
with the liability of a manufacturer who, erroneously labeling a deadly
poison, belladonna, to be a harmless substance, caused injury to a
plaintiff not in privity with the producer of the drug. There the court
eliminated privity as a requirement where "inherently dangerous" products
were involved. This exception was adopted in Oklahoma in Ford Motor
Company v.Livesay' under circumstances strangely reminiscent of the
Winterbottom case, as the case involved the failure of a wheel on an
automobile assembled by the defendant manufacturer.
The broadest and most general exception to the rule was established
by the well-reasoned decision of Judge Cardozo in MacPherson v.Buick
Motor Company' which likewise dealt with a defective automobile wheel.
Judge Cardozo, apparently conceding an automobile not to be inherently
dangerous, nevertheless stated: "If the nature of a thing is such that it
is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made, it is then a thing of danger." Coincidentally, the McPherson and
Ford Motor Company decisions were handed down the same year but
the MacPherson doctrine establishing the exception as to "imminently
dangerous" products was not to be applied in this state until the decision
in Crane Company v. Sears.' In a wrongful death action the court held
the defendant manufacturer liable when a pipe flange incorporated in
a steam system ruptured, fatally burning the decedent. In Dawson v.
McWilliams, the Federal Court, applying Oklahoma law and referring
to the Crane holding relates that this state has fully embraced the
MacPherson doctrine. In operation, the "imminently dangerous" exception
vastly broadened the major exceptions to the general rule and obviated
privity as a requirement for recovery over a wide, indeed, almost unlimited
range of products. In fact, it is said the MacPherson case has "caused the
exception to swallow the asserted general rule of nonliability, . . ."I
In Gosnell v. Zink,' the Crane rationale was extended to cover damage to
36 N.Y.397 (1852), 57 Am.Dec.455.
461 Okla. 231, 160 P.901 (1916).

5217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), L.R.A. 1916F 696.
6168 Okla. 603, 35 P.2d 916 (1934).
7146 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1944) - Applying Oklahoma law.
8
Carter v.Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (1946), 164
A.LR. 559.
9325 P2d 965 (Okla. 1958).
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property. The Oklahoma decisions dearly established that privity is not
essential to recovery in negligence actions growing out of product-caused
injuries where the products in question were imminently dangerous,
and those decisions are numerous."
Modulating from negligence into warranty, the major exception is
consistently applied in Oklahoma where products of the character of
food and drink are concerned. In Southwest Ice and Dairy Products Co.
v. Faulkenberry," although privity existed between the plaintiff and defendant, our court stated:
A manufacturer or processor of food products under modem conditions impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed in original
packages or bottles and such warranty is available to all who may
be damaged by their use in legitimate channels of trade, including
those who purchase them for resale. (emphasis added)
The same result was reached in Griffin v. Asbury" when the court said
that where a bottled beverage, intended for human consumption is
sealed by the manufacturer the manufacturer impliedly warrants such
beverage to be fit for human consumption. Likewise, Cook v. Safeway
Stores Inc.'3 applies the same exception in the broadest possible terms
by holding that an implied warranty of wholesomeness of food sold for
human consumption runs in favor of a consumer not only from the retail
seller, but also from the manufacturer, packer, processor, and any
intermediate dealer.
Fraud, in this state, is suggested to be a circumstance sufficient to
create an exception to the privity rule."
The violation of a statute has also, at least inferentially, been recognized as a basis for an exception. In Spencer v. Holt," the Oklahoma
court approved the following language: "It is an implied duty on the
part of one who sells explosives to give notice of their dangerous
character, which duty is some time expressly enjoined by statute. Where
one sells oil in violation of the statute, his liability is not confined to
the immediate vendee, but extends to subsequent purchases."
While denying recovery to the plaintiff on other grounds, Auten v.
Livingston," extends an exception to the general rule when dealing with
situations involving employees of one who is in privity with the manufacturer.
The recently adopted Uniform Commercial Code applies the exception to the benefit of members of a purchaser's family and guests in
the following language:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or
"0Marker v. Universal Oil Products Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1959);
McWilliams v. Dawson, 48 F.Supp. 538 (1943); Cases cited, supra notes 6 and 9.
11203 Okla. 279, 220 P.2d 257, 260 (1950), 17 A.L.R.2d 1373.
12196 Okla. 484, 165 P.2d 822 (1945).
3
1 330 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1958).

See Crane v. Sears, infra, fn. 6.
1s 82 Okla. 280, 200 P. 187, 189 (1921).
6201 Okla. 467, 207 P.2d 256 (1949).
14
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who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section. 7
Generally in Oklahoma, privity has been an essential element to
recovery against negligent contractors as evidenced by the fact that
liability ordinarily terminates upon acceptance of a contract by the
contractee. However, in Leigh v. Wadsworth," the tenant of a subvendee of the defendant contractor was allowed recovery for injuries
sustained when a porch, negligently constructed by defendant, fell two
years after construction. The same result was reached in Schlender v.
Andy Jansen Company." In each of these decisions the court held the
acceptance of a contract did not terminate liability to third persons and
thus allowed recovery to the injured plaintiff who was completely remote
to the contract out of which the injuries arose. The court said, as a
matter of public policy, a builder's liability to third persons for negligent
construction generally is terminated upon acceptance by the contractee,
but where the contractor has wilfully created a condition which he knows,
or ought to know by the exercise of ordinary care, to be immediately
and certainly dangerous to persons other than the contractee, considerations of public policy do not require the application of the general rule.
This rational has also been extended to include property damage, as
well as bodily injury?
To recapitulate, the Oklahoma court has ignored privity as essential
to recovery in a variety of situations involving inherently dangerous
products, imminently dangerous products, food and beverages, fraud,
statutory violations, sales regulated by the Uniform Commercial Code and
in cases involving negligent contractors where injuries to sub-grantees
occurred after completion of the contract. Therefore, the conclusion is
inescapable that the rule of Winterbottom v. Wright2 has been substantially eroded and modified in this state. Indeed, to paraphrase the
statement in Carter v. Yardley & Cor pany,' the many, varied, and
forceful exceptions have all but swallowed up the rule.
In warranty cases the rule has been completely eliminated in
California, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and
Tennessee?
7
12A O.S. § 2-318 (1961).
18361 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1961).
19380 P.2d 523 (Okla. 1962).
20Lowe v. Francis Construction Co., 373 P.2d 51 (Okla. 1962).
21
Ina, fa. 2.
2Infra, fn. 8.
23Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897 (1962) -Applies to warranty and negligence; Picker X-Ray Corp.
v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Mun. App. 1962); Continental
Copper & Steel Industries, Inc. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So.2d 40
1

(F a. App. 1958); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F.Supp. 78 (Hawaii 1961), aff'd
304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v.
Anderson-Weber, Inc. 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); B. F. Goodrich
Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders
& Masonry Supply Co., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Worley v. Proctor
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